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A B S T R A C T
Hyperbolic discounting is one potential reason why savings remain low among the poor. Most evidence of
hyperbolic discounting is based on violations of either stationarity or time consistency. Stationarity is violated
when intertemporal choices differ for trade-offs in the near versus the more distant future. Time consistency is
violated if the optimal allocation for specific dates changes over time. Both types of choice reversals may
however also result from time-varying discount rates. Hyperbolic discounting is an unambiguous explanation
for choice reversals only if the same individuals violate both stationarity and time consistency. Our field
experiment in Nigeria examines the extent to which this is the case. The experiment measured both stationarity
and time consistency for the same participants. Violations of the two rarely coincide, especially among more
liquidity-constrained participants. Thus, in a context of liquidity constraints, eliciting only one type of choice
reversal is insufficient to identify hyperbolic discounting.
1. Introduction
For the poor, consumption smoothing is hindered by fluctuating
cash flows and limited access to formal credit and insurance (Collins
et al., 2009). This is compounded by a constrained ability to save
(Dupas and Robinson, 2013). One potential reason for low savings is
hyperbolic discounting, meaning that implicit discount rates are lower
for tradeoffs in the more distant future than for tradeoffs in the near
future (Frederick et al., 2002). A hyperbolic discounter violates time
consistency, i.e. she prefers to invest towards increased future con-
sumption when asked far in advance, but when asked right before
investing the money, she opts for sooner but lower consumption. She
also violates stationarity, meaning that she prefers for example $110
in 31 days over $100 in 30 days, but rather has $100 today instead of
$110 tomorrow (Green et al., 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995).
Empirical observations of either violation have been interpreted as
evidence of hyperbolic discounting.
However, hyperbolic discounting is an unambiguous explanation
for such choice reversals only if the same person violates both
stationarity and time consistency. A second yet often neglected
explanation for choice reversals is a violation of time invariance
(Halevy, 2015), which means that the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) changes over time.1 For example, one month ago someone
preferred $110 a day later over $100 the same day, but when asked
again today she prefers $100 immediately over $110 tomorrow. This
difference may among others be due to changes in the economic
environment (Read et al., 2012), either through unanticipated shocks
to household finances (Dean and Sautmann, 2016) or through antici-
pated changes in income (Epper, 2016). Crucially, when stationarity or
time consistency are measured in isolation, one may wrongly interpret
choice reversals caused by time-varying background wealth as evidence
of hyperbolic discounting.
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This paper therefore analyzes to what extent stationarity and time
consistency overlap by means of a field experiment in rural Nigeria.
The experiment elicited three convex time budget allocations
(Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a) using a longitudinal design adapted
from Giné et al. (2016). Participants distributed a future gift over a
sooner-smaller and a later-larger reward. Sooner and later rewards
arrived ‘tomorrow’ and ‘in one month’ for the first allocation, ‘in two
months’ and ‘in three months’ for the second allocation made on the
same day, and ‘tomorrow’ and ‘in one month’ for the third allocation.
The third allocation was made two months after the others and hence
concerned the same calendar dates as the second allocation, but the
time until the two payment dates was the same as in the first allocation.
The experiment elicited each of these three allocations for 240
participants. Rejecting stationarity requires different choices in the first
and second allocation, elicited on the same day with varying front-end
delays. Time consistency is rejected by differences in the second and
third allocation, elicited at different points in time regarding the same
calendar dates. Finally, time invariance is violated when a participant
chooses differently in the first and third allocation, elicited on different
days but both framed as an allocation over ‘tomorrow’ and ‘in one
month’ (Halevy, 2015). If time invariance is satisfied, a hyperbolic
discounter will violate both stationarity and time consistency.
Observing either choice reversal is sufficient to infer hyperbolic
discounting only in that case. If time invariance is not satisfied,
observing a violation of either choice reversal is not sufficient to
identify hyperbolic discounters. This paper sheds light on the severity
of the potential misclassification.
We find that violations of time consistency and stationarity often do
not overlap. While 43.4 percent of participants violates time consis-
tency, only 24.2 percent violates both time consistency and stationarity,
and 62 percent of violations result from time-variant choices instead.
Moreover, for nearly half of this subsample, the two choice reversals
move in different directions with one present-biased and one future-
biased violation. This is not just noise in decision-making; participants
who violate time consistency but not stationarity have significantly less
access to informal credit and lose more wealth over time than other
participants. This suggests that violations of time invariance are in part
due to liquidity constraints. As a result, when observed in isolation,
choice reversals are not sufficient evidence of hyperbolic discounting.
Instead, identifying hyperbolic discounters requires a longitudinal
design eliciting both stationarity and time consistency.
This paper makes three unique contributions to the literature. First,
the experiment links choice reversals to violations of time invariance.
To our best knowledge, Halevy (2015) is the only study with similar
analyses, but using a different subject pool (undergraduate students in
economics). Giné et al. (2016) link measures of stationarity to time
consistency for a subject pool that is more comparable to ours, but do
not provide measures of time invariance. Meier and Sprenger (2015)
measure stationarity and time invariance, but not time inconsistency.
Other experimental studies either analyze violations of stationarity (e.g.
Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Carvalho et al., 2016)
or of time consistency (e.g. Sayman and Öncüler, 2009; Read et al.,
2012), without linking the two.
Second, we test whether liquidity constraints can explain why
stationarity and time consistency often do not overlap, i.e. why
participants violate time invariance.2 Unlike Halevy (2015), we can
identify liquidity-constrained participants using rich survey data on
participants’ financial characteristics. We find that compared to other
participants, those who are relatively most constrained are significantly
more likely to violate time consistency without also violating statio-
narity. We identify liquidity-constrained participants as those with less
access to credit and greater reductions in wealth, independent of
whether the household explicitly reports a shock. This distinguishes
our paper from Giné et al. (2016) and Dean and Sautmann (2016),
whose empirical analyses focus mainly on unanticipated expenditure
and income shocks, and from Carvalho et al. (2016), who link
stationarity to the timing of anticipated income. Our measure captures
both anticipated and unanticipated liquidity constraints.
Third, the finding that liquidity constraints result in violations of
time invariance relates to the literature on the temporal stability of
time preferences. Identifying temporal stability (or time invariance)
requires a longitudinal design in which the experimental methodology
and the subject pool are fixed (Frederick et al., 2002). The main
incentivized field experiment with such a design, Meier and Sprenger
(2015), finds that any observed temporal instability can be explained
by random noise. By contrast, Krupka and Stephens (2013) use a panel
with hypothetical choices collected during a period of high inflation and
find that elicited discount rates are correlated to economic factors such
as the inflation rate and household income, suggesting that temporal
instability of expressed time preferences is not purely random. This is
more consistent with our findings, supporting the theory that standard
experimental measures of time preferences and stationarity capture
financial constraints and changes in non-experimental wealth rather
than innate discount rates (Dean and Sautmann, 2016; Epper, 2016).
These findings have potential implications for policies that promote
savings in low-income settings. Savings play an important role in
smoothing consumption, in particular for the poor with volatile cash
flows and limited access to formal financial services (Collins et al.,
2009). Hyperbolic discounting is one of the main theories used to
explain low savings rates, but this theory is based on observed
violations of either stationarity or time consistency. Our findings
suggest that such violations are often driven by liquidity constraints.
Hence, policies that aim at promoting savings among the poor should
not only address hyperbolic discounting, but also consider the role of
liquidity constraints when designing mechanisms to improve their
ability to save.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines a
conceptual framework to interpret the relation between stationarity,
time consistency, and time invariance. Section 3 describes the experi-
ment. Section 4 presents our results and discusses the role of liquidity
constraints. Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
To show why violations of stationarity as measured in most (cross-
sectional) time preference experiments do not necessarily overlap with
time inconsistent behavior, this section first outlines the types of
intertemporal allocations considered in the experiment. We then
describe how one can infer violations of stationarity, time consistency
and time invariance from these allocations, and discuss conditions
under which one can identify hyperbolic discounting. Finally, we
formulate hypotheses on how liquidity constraints resulting from
changes in background wealth may lead to non-overlapping violations
of stationarity and time consistency.
Consider a consumer allocating a gift of g vouchers over two future
payment dates. She allocates x vouchers to a later date, denoted pL,
and the remaining g x− vouchers to a sooner date, pS. Each voucher
allocated to the later date is worth vL. Vouchers allocated to the sooner
date are worth vS and are never worth more than vouchers allocated to
the later date, v v≤S L.
Allocations are made at the start of two distinct rounds, at decision
moments τ1 and τ2. The consumer allocates her vouchers between a
sooner and later payment date in the first round, p p{ , }S L1 1 , and
2 In that respect, our subject pool is of particular interest; subject pools from university
labs may have better access to sound financial instruments. In their context, allocations
involving monetary rewards are potentially influenced by the interest rate at which
participants can save and borrow outside the experiment (Chabris et al., 2008).
Augenblick et al. (2015) overcome this problem by eliciting time preferences using effort
rather than monetary rewards. In our context of thin financial markets, changes in
consumption are likely to follow small changes in income very closely (Halevy, 2014), so
that intertemporal allocations of monetary rewards are more closely related to the MRS.
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between a sooner and later payment date in the second round,
p p{ , }S L2 2 . In both rounds, the sooner payment date immediately
follows the decision moment associated with that round, τ1 and τ2,
respectively. This yields the three intertemporal allocations x1,1, x1,2 and
x2,2 depicted in Table 1.
The first allocation, x1,1, is made at the start of the first round (at
t τ= 1) regarding the payment dates during the first round, p p{ , }S L1 1 ,
which are both in the near future. The second allocation, x1,2, also
concerns a choice made at the first decision moment, but concerns the
payment dates during the second round, p p{ , }S L2 2 , which are in the
distant future. The third allocation, x2,2, is made at the start of the
second round and concerns the payment dates during the second
round, p p{ , }S L2 2 . This allocation hence concerns the same payment
dates as the second choice, but these payment dates are again in the
near future, as in the first choice.
Table 2 illustrates how these three allocations combined elicit
violations of time consistency, stationarity, and time invariance (see
also Halevy, 2015). Stationarity is violated when otherwise similar
intertemporal choices (with respect to the delay between pS and pL)
depend on the front-end delay, i.e. the amount of time between the
decision moment and the sooner payment date. In our experiment the
delay between payment dates is the same across allocations. We thus
observe a violation of stationarity when the two first-round decisions,
x1,1 and x1,2, are not identical, i.e. x x≠1,1 1,2.
Time consistency is violated when a person's allocation between
two payment dates at fixed points in time is affected by the time span
between the decision moment and the two payment dates. In our
experiment, we observe a violation of time consistency when first-
round allocations regarding the second-round payment dates, x1,2, are
not the same as second-round allocations regarding the same payment
dates, x x≠1,2 2,2.
A violation of time invariance implies that the timing of the decision
moment influences the intertemporal choice when the front-end delay
remains the same. In other words, in an otherwise similar choice, a
person becomes more or less patient depending on when she takes the
decision. This can result from random noise in decision-making,
changes in wealth or changes in the underlying structural time
preferences. The experiment therefore tests whether the first-round
allocation over first-round payment dates, x1,1, differs from the second-
round allocation over second-round payment dates, x x≠1,1 2,2.
These three violations are closely linked. Halevy (2015) proves that
if one of them occurs, we must observe at least one other violation. An
individual's allocations x x x{ , , }1,1 1,2 2,2 can hence be categorized into one
of five collectively exhaustive groups:
1. x x x= =1,1 1,2 2,2. In this group, choices are identical regardless of
front-end delay and decision moment, thereby satisfying time
consistency, stationarity and time invariance.
2. x x x≠ =1,1 1,2 2,2. In this group, allocations for second-round payment
dates do not depend on the decision moment, thereby satisfying time
consistency, x x=1,2 2,2. However, these two allocations differ from
the first-round allocation regarding first-round payment dates, x1,1,
violating stationarity and time invariance.
3. x x x= ≠1,1 1,2 2,2. In the first round, this group makes identical
decisions independent of the timing of payment dates, thereby
satisfying stationarity, x x=1,1 1,2. However, in the second round, this
group chooses a different allocation, violating time consistency and
time invariance.
4. x x x= ≠1,1 2,2 1,2. In this group, allocations regarding near-future
payment dates do not depend on when the decision is made, thereby
satisfying time invariance, x x=1,1 2,2. This group however chooses a
different allocation regarding distant-future payment dates, violating
stationarity and time consistency.
5. x x x≠ ≠1,1 1,2 2,2. In this group, individuals choose different alloca-
tions in each type of choice, thereby violating time consistency,
stationarity, and time invariance.
Thus, as long as time invariance is satisfied (Groups 1 and 4), a
violation of stationarity coincides with – and can be interpreted as – a
violation of time consistency. However, when time invariance is
violated, the two do not necessarily coincide, and a violation of
stationarity cannot be interpreted as a violation of time consistency
(Groups 2, 3 and 5).
To illustrate how these concepts relate to hyperbolic discounting,
assume a two-period discounted utility framework with time-separable
utility and – for tractability – quasi-hyperbolic discounting (also
referred to as βδ-discounting, Laibson, 1997).3 We also assume that
individuals lack access to financial markets, and cannot transfer
background wealth ω from outside the experiment between the sooner
and the later payment date. The three voucher allocations optimize the
following three target functions:4
Table 1
Three types of intertemporal choices.
Round 1: Near Future x1,1
Round 1: Distant Future x1,2
Round 2: Near Future x2,2
Time t
Circles represent two different decision moments, t τ= 1 for a first round and t τ= 2 for a second round. During these decision moments, people allocate g vouchers to a sooner and a later
payment date. Squares represent the payment dates at which consumers can choose to receive the future gift. The sooner date is labeled ‘S’, and the later date is labeled ‘L’. These
payment dates are either in the period following the first round (for the first choice, x1,1) or in the period following the second round (for the second and third choice, x1,2 and x2,2). The
first and third choice concern payout dates in the near future. For the second choice, made in the first round regarding the payment dates in the second round, payout dates are in the
distant future.
Table 2
Defining three types of violations.
Type of violation Decision round Payment round
Violation of stationarity x1,1 ≠ x1,2 R1 R1 vs. R2
Violation of time consistency x1,2 ≠ x2,2 R1 vs. R2 R2
Violation of time invariance x1,1 ≠ x2,2 R1 vs. R2 R1 vs. R2
xi j, represents the number of vouchers (out of a maximum of ten) that a participant
allocates to the later payment date at decision moment i for payment dates j.
3 Strictly speaking, quasi-hyperbolic discounting distinguishes the present (today)
from the future (tomorrow and any later day). Given that our soonest payment takes
place the next day, we need to assume that tomorrow will still be considered as the
(extended) present by the participants, so that β = 1 for payments tomorrow. This will be
the case when adopting a more general hyperbolic discount function.
4 Our experiment implements only one of these three allocations, so that the first-
round allocation regarding first-round payment dates does not influence background
wealth in allocations regarding second-round payment dates.
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where τt represents expectations at the time of round t, u(·) instanta-
neous consumption utility, g the experimental gift, xt j, the number of
vouchers allocated to the later date of payment dates j in round t, and
vS and vL the value of vouchers allocated to the sooner and later
payment date, respectively. Further, δ0 < < 1 represents an exponen-
tial discount factor for the later relative to the sooner payment date and
β0 < ≤ 1 a present-bias parameter by which all instantaneous utilities
for future payments are discounted.
An individual's background wealth on the sooner versus the later
payment date in round t is indicated as ωtS and ωtL, respectively. For
simplicity, we hold background wealth on the later payment date
constant, ω ω=L L1 2 , and focus on ceteris paribus effects of changes in
background wealth on the sooner payment date. We do so because
background wealth at the later payment date, ωtL, is not known at
decision moment τt, in contrast to ωtS. As a result, analyzing changes
in expected future background wealth is analytically less tractable. In
addition, we measured background wealth empirically around the time
of the sooner but not the later payment date. In the context of our
experiment, the effects of a ceteris paribus change in background
wealth on the sooner payment date are hence more relevant from an
empirical perspective. Allowing for changes in future background
wealth would either dampen or amplify choice reversals, depending
on whether the difference in background wealth on the sooner versus
later payment date is reduced or widened.5
We will now discuss how present bias, β < 1, and changes in
background wealth, ωtS, lead to choice reversals. First assume that
background wealth is stable over time, so that ω ω=τ S τ S1 21 2  . In that
case, the first-round allocation regarding first-round payment dates
equals the second-round allocation regarding second-round payment
dates, x x=1,1 2,2, and time invariance is not violated. If β ≠ 1, alloca-
tions will violate both stationarity, x x≠1,1 1,2, and time consistency,
x x≠1,2 2,2. Thus, under the assumption of time invariance, a violation of
stationarity implies a violation of time consistency and vice versa, and
(quasi-) hyperbolic discounters will violate both stationarity and time
consistency in a present-biased direction, x x<1,1 1,2 and x x<2,2 1,2,
because for them, β < 1. In this case, measuring either stationarity or
time consistency is sufficient to infer hyperbolic discounting.
Now assume that background wealth at the sooner payment date
changes over time, ω ω≠τ S τ S1 21 2  . If participants cannot save or
borrow, they cannot smooth background wealth over time. As a result,
allocations regarding same-round payment dates, x1,1 and x2,2, will
differ, and the participant will violate time invariance. Specifically, if
ω ω<τ S τ S1 21 2  , a participant will allocate fewer vouchers to the later
payment date in the first round than in the second round in allocations
regarding same-round payment dates. In other words, a participant
becomes more patient over time. If ω ω>τ S τ S1 21 2  , participants
become less patient over time.
In this case, even in the absence of hyperbolic discounting, β = 1, a
participant will violate either stationarity or time consistency, depend-
ing on whether the change in wealth is already anticipated in the first
round. If anticipated, such that ω ω ω≠ =τ S τ S τ S1 2 21 1 2   , stationarity is
violated, x x x≠ =1,1 1,2 2,2. In case of reduced wealth (and patience) from
the first to the second round, this choice reversal is future-biased. If
unanticipated, ω ω ω= ≠τ S τ S τ S1 2 21 1 2   , time consistency is violated,
x x x= ≠1,1 1,2 2,2, and a reduction in wealth results in a present-biased
choice reversal. Thus, when time invariance is violated, observing non-
stationary or time-inconsistent choices is not necessarily indicative of
hyperbolic discounting, but may instead capture consumption smooth-
ing.
An important assumption in the discussion above is that individuals
lack access to credit and savings. In perfectly functioning financial
markets, participants would not need to violate time invariance in
order to smooth consumption. Dean and Sautmann (2016) highlight
this point in relation to the effect of unexpected income shocks on
standard experimental measures of time preferences; and Epper (2016)
uses a similar argument when attributing stationarity violations to
anticipated increases in income. We therefore formulate the following
hypotheses for individuals who lack access to credit:
1) If changes in background wealth are anticipated,
Hypothesis 1a. … decreasing background wealth on sooner payment
dates ( ω ω>τ S τ S1 21 2  ) is associated with future-biased violations of
stationarity, but not of time consistency.
Hypothesis 1b. … increasing background wealth on sooner payment
dates ( ω ω<τ S τ S1 21 2  ) is associated with present-biased violations of
stationarity, but not of time consistency.
2) If changes in background wealth are unanticipated,
Hypothesis 2a. … decreasing background wealth on sooner payment
dates ( ω ω>τ S τ S1 21 2  ) is associated with present-biased violations of
time consistency, but not of stationarity.
Hypothesis 2b. … increasing background wealth on sooner payment
dates ( ω ω<τ S τ S1 21 2  ) is associated with future-biased violations of
time consistency, but not of stationarity.
In conclusion, we argue that when time invariance is violated, one
can only infer hyperbolic discounting from observing both time
consistency and stationarity. The majority of existing time preference
experiments however elicit only violations of stationarity, using cross-
sectional designs with one decision moment regarding different pay-
ment dates. Systematic violations of time invariance due to predictable
or unpredictable changes in the economic environment may confound
the conclusions from these experiments.
3. Experimental methods and procedures
3.1. Design
To test whether violations of time consistency empirically overlap
with violations of stationarity, we conducted an artefactual field
experiment in rural Nigeria. The experiment elicited participants’
intertemporal allocations using Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)'s
convex time budget method. Participants received ten vouchers to
divide between two future payment dates, with the later date exactly
one month after the sooner date. Vouchers allocated to the later
payment date were always worth 200 NGN.6 Vouchers allocated to
the sooner payment date were worth either 200, 150, 120 or 100 NGN.
Participants allocated their budgets between the two payment dates
in three different incentivized scenarios: (i) a first-round allocation
dividing the ten vouchers between payment dates soon after the first
round, ‘tomorrow’ and ‘one month from now’ (yielding choice x1,1); (ii)
a first-round allocation dividing the vouchers between payment dates
in a more distant future, ‘2 months from now’ and ‘3 months from now’
(yielding x1,2); and (iii) a second-round allocation conducted two
months later for the same payment dates, and hence framed again as
‘tomorrow’ and ‘one month from now’ (yielding x2,2). Thus, within
5 Epper (2016) and Noor (2009) develop models for intertemporal choice in which
currently liquidity-constrained individuals violate stationarity without violating time
consistency because they expect an increase in income in a not so distant future, i.e. a
change in ω1L compared to ω1S. The mechanisms behind the results in our conceptual
framework – changing ω2S compared to ω1S - are comparable to the mechanisms in these
two papers.
6 At the time of the experiment, 100 NGN (Nigerian Naira) was worth approximately
0.62 USD.
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subjects, we varied (a) the delay between the decision moment and the
payment dates; and (b) the timing of the decision moment itself. As
such, the experiment elicits measures of stationarity, time invariance
and time consistency, as shown in Table 1.
Note that in choices regarding the near future, the earliest payment
date was tomorrow. Due to this front-end delay, we are unable to
identify pure quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which assumes structurally
different discounting of the present versus the future. We opted for a
small delay before the first payment for two reasons. First, paying
participants the same day was logistically difficult. Second, delaying the
payment by one day helped avoid possible confounds such as differ-
ential transaction costs between payment dates or trust issues (Chabris
et al., 2008). Sozou (1998) showed that the perceived risk of default of
the experimenter differs between immediate payments and any future
payments, but that the perceived difference in risk between different
payment moments in the future is negligible. An increasing number of
studies therefore avoids immediate payments and we followed this
approach (for additional references and a detailed discussion, see
Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a).
3.2. Procedures
Participants were recruited from a sample of farming households in
Kwara State, Nigeria, who were interviewed weekly about their health
and finances from March 2012 to May 2013.7 Fig. 1 illustrates a
timeline of this experiment. In March 2012, a baseline survey collected
individual characteristics for all household members. In April 2012, we
conducted the first round of the experiment. Enumerators visited the
households and interviewed all adult household members in private
following a script with the experimental instructions (see the Online
Appendix).8 They first elicited choices regarding the second-round
payment dates, framed as payments ‘in three months’ versus ‘in two
months’ from now, followed by a break with survey questions. After
this intentional break, which served to reduce potential efforts to
appear consistent across choices, enumerators elicited choices regard-
ing the first-round payment dates, framed as payments ‘in one month’
from now versus ‘tomorrow’.9
Allocations regarding first- and second-round payment dates were
both made for the four different values of vouchers allocated to the
sooner date. To ensure incentive compatibility, we randomly selected
one of these allocations for each participant for actual payout. To retain
a large enough sample for the second round, the probability of selecting
a choice regarding second-round payment dates was 0.9.10 Participants
did not know the exact probabilities. They were told that the computer
would randomly select one question and that this would be one of the
eight questions they were about to answer.
The ten percent of participants for whom a first-round choice was
selected for payment received their payments according to their initial
allocation. By contrast, those who were to be paid during the second
round were revisited unexpectedly two months later, in June, just
before their ‘sooner’ payment date. They received the opportunity to
revise their earlier choice that was selected for payment. The enu-
merator clearly showed them their initial choice given the selected
voucher values for second-round payment dates, x1,2, and asked them
to indicate their preferred allocation once more. They were paid
according to this new allocation rather than the initial choice.
Participants were reassured that they could leave their allocation as it
was or change it to whatever allocation they preferred.
On payment dates, enumerators returned to every participant with
a payout on that day and exchanged vouchers valid on that particular
day for cash. The experimental design allowed participants to earn
between 1000 and 2000 NGN, and they earned 1862 NGN on average.
These stakes are fairly high, as the maximum possible payment of 2000
NGN is equivalent to approximately three days of work among the
employed participant sample. Further, concerns about a lack of
participant trust in receiving the experimental pay-outs are limited,
as participants were part of a larger ongoing study for which they were
being interviewed by the same research team on a regular basis.
Allowing participants to revise their choices unexpectedly has
advantages and disadvantages (Halevy, 2015). One advantage is that
all choices in the first round are truly incentivized. If instead
participants knew they would be allowed to revise their choice
regarding second-round payment dates, we would have incentivized
only choices regarding the near-future payment dates, x1,1 and x2,2. We
wanted to rule out this potential explanation for violations of statio-
narity and time consistency. Further, in this way, the option to allocate
money between the two payment dates was unanticipated in both
rounds, limiting the effect of the experimental payments on financial
behavior prior to the decision.
At the same time, paying the second-round decision without prior
disclosure raises a number of concerns. First, participants may think
they are expected to revise their choices during the second round. If
this were an important consideration, participants would violate time
consistency more often than stationarity, deviate from the initial
allocation by just a few vouchers, and violate at similar rates in
present- and future-biased directions. We do not observe such choice
patterns. Second, the revisit might decrease participants’ trust in future
payments. However, when asked to motivate their second-round
choices, participants only mentioned how they would use the experi-
mental payments and never pointed at a lack of trust (see Online
Appendix Fig. B2). Hence, we have no indication that second-round
decisions were driven by the option to revise allocations unexpect-
edly.11
3.3. Description of the participant sample
The experiment targeted 303 individuals who participated in the
baseline survey in March 2012. Of those, 286 persons (94.4 percent)
Fig. 1. Timeline of the Study. Circles represent two different decision moments, t τ= 1 for
a first round at t=0 and t τ= = 2 for a second round sixty days later. During these
decision moments, people allocate vouchers to a sooner and a later payment date.
Squares represent the payment dates at which consumers can choose to receive the future
gift. The sooner date is labeled ‘S’, and the later date is labeled ‘L’. These payment dates
are either in the period following the first round (for the first choice, x1,1) or in the period
following the second round (for the second and third choice, x1,2 and x2,2). The first and
third choice concern payout dates in the near future. For the second choice, made in the
first round regarding the payment dates in the second round, payout dates are in the
distant future.
7 This is the Health and Financial Diaries study implemented by the Amsterdam
Institute for International Development in collaboration with the PharmAccess
Foundation and the University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital (Janssens et al., 2013).
8 We targeted the household head, their spouses, and other adult household members
not enrolled in school.
9 To enhance understanding of the time preference games, enumerators used a
wooden board with two bowls representing the sooner and the later payment date, and
small vouchers that people had to divide over the two bowls. The order of the questions
was not randomized. Order effects are expected to be limited, since Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012a, 2012b) and Giné et al. (2016) do not find any evidence of order effects.
10 This probability was less than 1 to ensure incentive compatibility of choices
regarding first-round payment dates.
11 In the period between the first and the second round, participants were visited on a
weekly basis by enumerators for the larger study in which we embedded the experiment.
This most likely increased their trust in receiving future payments. Also, in most
communities, some of the participants had received payments in the first round, further
signaling experimenter trustworthiness to others.
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participated in the first round of our experiment. For 256 participants
(89.5 percent of first-round participants), the experiment selected a
choice regarding payment dates following the second round, and
among them, 240 (93.8 percent) participated in the second round.
For the remaining sixteen first-round participants, we did not observe
second-round allocations because a few participants moved away from
the study area, and one participant had passed away. His family
members were hence mourning and did not participate in the second
round either.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for all participants in the
experiment. Columns (1) and (2) show the number of observations and
the mean for all 286 participants who completed the first round of the
experiment. The average age of the participants is just over 40 years of
age and around forty percent of participants are male. On average, 2.8
members per household participated in the experiment. We therefore
cluster standard errors in all analyses at the household level. The
majority of participants never entered the formal school system. The
two predominant sources of income among participants are farming
(37.8 percent) and business (40.2 percent).
Since businesses are often related to farming, participants’ financial
situation depends heavily on the agricultural season. The experiment
was conducted in the period between planting and harvest. At baseline,
only seven percent of the farmers expected to harvest before July, when
the later payment date of the second round was due. Since farmers
incur expenditures to harvest their produce and generally prefer to wait
until market prices increase instead of selling their harvest right away,
the harvest time is a liquidity-constrained period. Participants may well
take this into account in allocations regarding second-round payment
dates. Consistent with this idea, average wealth (calculated as the
balance of all financial assets and liabilities within a household)
reduces from the start of the first to the second round by a sizable
10,000 NGN, which is 17 percent of wealth at baseline, and five times
the maximum experimental payout of 2000 NGN.
Furthermore, only 42.6 percent of participants have relatively easy
access to informal credit. The other participants either cannot borrow
20,000 NGN in case of an emergency, or need to borrow from three or
more different people to raise this amount. Given that the vast majority of
our sample is unbanked, such a limited ability to borrow from one's
informal network suggests that this person has limited access to credit in
general. This group will be liquidity constrained if experiencing a significant
reduction in wealth.
A large body of literature discusses the possible effects of limited
understanding on conclusions drawn from time preference experiments
(see for example Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). If a participant does not
fully understand the task or its implications, her decisions will not
accurately represent her underlying time preferences. Enumerators devoted
a significant amount of time to explain the convex time budget task. To test
whether poor understanding can nevertheless have introduced noise in the
allocations, leading to violations of stationarity, time consistency or time
invariance, we test a simple monotonicity condition. When the return on
waiting increases, participants should never allocate fewer vouchers to the
later payment date.
To test whether participants satisfied this monotonicity concept, we
compare allocations when sooner vouchers are worth (1) 200 NGN vs.
150 NGN, (2) 150 NGN vs. 120 NGN, and (3) 120 NGN vs. 100 NGN;
for both near-future (x1,1) and distant-future (x1,2) allocations. Using
these six comparison pairs, 219 of the 240 participants in the final
sample (91.3 percent) never violate monotonicity. Further, of the 1440
pairs (6 pairs times 240 participants), 1410 pairs (97.9 percent) satisfy
monotonicity, suggesting similar levels of understanding as university
students participating in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), and better
understanding than more comparable participants in Giné et al.
(2016).
Following Chakraborty et al. (2015), we also test for demand mono-
tonicity by comparing the number of interior versus corner allocations in
the entire data set. The percentage of choice sets violating demand
monotonicity never exceeds 11.5 percent and does not increase in the
number of interior choices in a choice set (see Online Appendix Table B1).
Such violations are hence not a major concern in our data. Chakraborty
et al. (2015) perform three additional tests to analyze the internal and
external consistency of data from convex time budgets: they test for the
weak axiom of revealed preferences, wealth monotonicity, and impatience
monotonicity. We do not have experimental variation to perform these
three tests. The total budget remained constant at 10 vouchers of 200 NGN,
which also implies that we cannot test whether participants choose to save
more as the experimental stakes increase; a magnitude effect that Epper
(2016) attributes to liquidity constraints.
The within-subject analyses only include participants for whom all three
choices depicted in Table 1 were elicited. For the 16 dropouts and the
randomly selected participants who received their allocation for first-round
payment dates, we cannot observe violations of time invariance or time
consistency. Columns (3) to (5) compare the 240 participants revisited
during the second round with the full sample. Attrition is not related to
observable characteristics. The only variables that differ significantly
between the full sample and the revisited sample are household size and
financial wealth at baseline. Wealth in the full sample did not reduce as
much as in the revisited subsample, in part because most non-revisited
participants received their experimental pay-out in the first round.
4. Results
This section describes the experimental results, starting with a descrip-
tion of how participants allocate their future gift over time. Next, we exploit
our within-subject design to identify how frequently violations of time
consistency overlap with violations of stationarity. Finally, this section finds
that violations of time invariance that account for this discrepancy can
Table 3
Description of participant characteristics.
All participants Revisited sample Difference
N Mean N Mean in means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 286 40.58 240 40.17 −0.406
Male 286 0.395 240 0.379 −0.016
No formal education 285 0.596 240 0.596 −0.001




286 0.378 240 0.367 −0.011
Main income from
business
286 0.402 240 0.417 0.015
Main income from other 286 0.098 240 0.096 −0.002
No main source of income 286 0.122 240 0.121 −0.002
Planning to harvest before
July
286 0.066 240 0.071 −0.005
Financial wealth R1 (in
1000 NGN)
286 63.25 240 71.15 7.902**
Financial wealth R2 (in
1000 NGN)
277 50.84 240 50.02 −0.82
More access to informal
credit
284 0.426 238 0.445 0.019
Satisfies monotonicity 286 0.087 240 0.087 0.000
Financial wealth is calculated as the balance of all financial assets and liabilities within a
household (the sum of current bank account balances, formal and informal savings, loans
and credits receivable, subtracted by outstanding credits and loans). An individual is
classified as having less access to credit if she cannot borrow 20,000 NGN in case of an
emergency, or needs to borrow from three or more different people to raise this amount.
We do not present standard deviations because all except four variables (age, the number
of children and two financial balances) are binary indicators. Significance levels in
Column (5) for variable y are based on a t-test for β = 0, where β is the difference
between revisited and non-revisited participants, estimated using a linear regression with
standard errors clustered at the household level. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
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partly be explained by changes in participants’ wealth.
4.1. Description of choices
Fig. 2 summarizes the number of vouchers that participants allocate
to the later payment date. Panel (a) includes all eight first-round
choices for each participant, showing allocations regarding first-round
payment dates (the light-gray bar, x1,1) versus second-round payment
dates (the dark-gray bar, x1,2). The figure separates choices by the value
of vouchers allocated to the sooner payment date (‘sooner vouchers’).
These vouchers are worth 200 NGN, 150 NGN, 120 NGN or 100 NGN.
Since vouchers allocated to the later payment date are worth a fixed
200 NGN, the return on waiting decreases in the value of sooner
vouchers. Thus, when sooner vouchers are worth 200 NGN, the return
on waiting is the lowest. In that case, participants indeed allocate most
vouchers to the sooner payment date, leaving on average 3.5 and 2.9
vouchers for the later date in choices regarding first- and second-round
payment dates, respectively. When sooner vouchers are worth 150
NGN, participants have a higher return on waiting and allocate about
five additional vouchers to the later date (p < 0.01). Compared to these
choices, when vouchers are worth 120 NGN, participants allocate an
additional half voucher to the later date (p < 0.01). Reducing the value
of sooner vouchers even further to 100 NGN has a very similar effect.
Hence, as the return on waiting increases, participants allocate more
vouchers to the later payment date; consistent with monotonicity.
Panel (a) also compares first-round choices regarding payment
dates in the near future, ‘tomorrow versus in one month’ (x1,1), with
choices regarding payment dates in the distant future, ‘in two months
versus in three months’ (x1,2). A significant difference in allocations
between these two choices implies a rejection of stationarity. When
there is no return on waiting, that is, when sooner vouchers are worth
200 NGN, participants allocate more vouchers to the later payment
date in choices regarding the near future, x1,1, than in choices regarding
the more distant future, x1,2 (p < 0.001), violating stationarity in a
future-biased direction. When there is a positive return on waiting, that
is, sooner vouchers are worth 150, 100 or 120 NGN, participants
allocate fewer vouchers to the later payment date in choices regarding
payments in the near future. These present-biased violations of
stationarity are consistent with hyperbolic discounting, but they are
small in absolute terms.12
In order to investigate time consistency and time invariance, Panel
(b) adds second-round choices. For comparison, this panel focuses on
choices for which we observe all three choice types, omitting two types
of first-round choices that do not have a second-round equivalent:
choices for voucher values that were not selected for payment, and
choices made by participants who were not revisited during the second
round. Second-round choices for payment dates in the near future, x2,2,
are different from both first-round allocations, x1,1 and x1,2, indepen-
dent of the value of vouchers allocated to the sooner payment date. We
hence reject the hypothesis that x x=1,2 2,2 (p < 0.01), implying a
violation of time consistency in the aggregate. Moreover, given that
allocations regarding near payment dates are not constant across the
two rounds, we reject the hypothesis that x x=1,1 2,2 (p < 0.01), implying
an aggregate violation of time invariance. In addition, these violations
are of much larger magnitude than violations of stationarity (x1,2 versus
x1,1).
We conclude that the aggregate data violate time consistency and
time invariance, and that these violations are much more pronounced
than violations of stationarity. This suggests that time-inconsistent
behavior is linked more closely to violations of time invariance than
stationarity, and the overlap between violations of time consistency and
stationarity appears limited. The remainder of this section will further
investigate the overlap between stationarity, time consistency and time
invariance, including only the randomly selected value of vouchers
allocated to the sooner payment date, for which all three choices (x1,1,
x1,2 and x2,2) are observed.
4.2. Classification of participants
Fig. 3 divides our participants into one of the five collectively
exhaustive groups discussed in Section 2 (the dark bars) and compares
our sample with the Halevy (2015) sample (the gray bars). Participants
in Groups 3, 4 and 5 violate time consistency. Nearly half of them –
19.6 out of 43.8 percent in our sample – coincide with a violation of
time invariance, without stationarity being violated (Group 3).
Likewise, among the 43.3 percent of participants who violate statio-
narity (Groups 2, 4 and 5), 19.2 percent violates time invariance
without violating time consistency (Group 2). Only 24.2 percent of
participants violates both stationarity and time consistency (Groups 4
and 5). Finally, 62 percent of all violations (Groups 2 to 5) are either
stationary but time-inconsistent or non-stationary but time-consistent,
Fig. 2. Number of vouchers allocated to the later date by choice type and voucher value.
Significance levels reported for choice type comparisons (x1,1 vs. x1,2, x1,2 vs. x2,2 and x1,1
vs. x2,2) are estimated from a regression of the number of vouchers allocated to the later
payment date on choice type, with standard errors clustered at the household level. †
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. (a) All first-round choices, (b) Three observations per
participant.
12 Allocations for sooner vouchers worth 200 NGN (with no return on waiting) thus
seem to follow a different pattern than allocations with sooner vouchers worth less than
200 NGN (yielding a positive return on waiting). We replicated all tables presented in
this paper for the sample excluding sooner vouchers worth 200 NGN (available upon
request). Omitting participants with sooner vouchers worth 200 NGN results in
qualitatively similar patterns to the ones presented in this paper.
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coinciding with time-variant choices instead (Groups 2 and 3). Thus,
the share of participants that violates stationarity is very similar to the
share that violates time consistency, but overlap between these two
groups is limited.
An important question is to what extent these findings differ from
those in Halevy (2015), the only existing experiment that relates time-
inconsistent behavior to violations of stationarity and time invariance.
There are large differences in methodology and subject pool between
Halevy's study and our own: Halevy (2015) used a multiple price list,
while we use a convex time budget method, and Halevy's sample
consisted of undergraduate students at the University of British
Columbia in Canada while the participants in our experiment are
adults living in rural Nigeria with limited access to financial markets.
Interestingly, the percentages of participants belonging to the
different groups is remarkably similar between the two studies. In
both studies, the majority of participants does not violate stationarity,
time consistency and time invariance (Group 1) and very few partici-
pants violate both time consistency and stationarity without also
violating time invariance (Group 4). The share of participants in the
other three groups is also very similar. Thus, despite differences in
design and subject pool between the two experiments, violations of
time consistency, stationarity and time invariance arise in very similar
ways.
Table 4 describes in more detail how well stationarity and time
consistency overlap in our experiment. The first column of Panel A
defines violations the same way as Table 2 does: any difference between
two allocations results in a violation of stationarity, time consistency or
time invariance. The correlation between violations of stationarity and
time consistency is 0.212, which is substantially lower than the
correlations between violations of stationarity and time invariance, or
time consistency and time invariance, which are 0.541 and 0.548,
respectively. The correlation between violations of stationarity and
time consistency in Halevy (2015) is 0.325, which is somewhat higher
than the correlation in our sample, but still lower than his correlations
between stationarity and time invariance (0.384), and between time
consistency and time invariance (0.537).
The model presented in Section 2 predicts that hyperbolic discounters
violate stationarity and time consistency in a present-biased direction.
These violations can however move in opposite directions when choices are
not time invariant. To analyze overlap in the direction of these violations,
Panel B presents statistics for present-biased violations only, treating
future-biased violations of stationarity (or time consistency) as an observa-
tion satisfying stationarity (or time consistency). Similarly, Panel C
specifically analyzes future-biased violations, treating present-biased viola-
tions of stationarity (or time consistency) as an observation satisfying
stationarity (or time consistency).
The first column of Panel B shows that only 10.4 percent of all
participants violates both stationarity and time consistency in a present-
biased direction, which is a mere 22.7 percent of those with at least one
present-biased violation. The correlation between present-biased violations
of stationarity and time consistency is 0.131, which is again substantially
lower than both the correlation between present-biased violations of
stationarity and time invariance (0.517) and the correlation between
present-biased violations of time consistency and time invariance
(0.738).13 In Panel C, only a small share of the participants violates both
time consistency and stationarity in a future-biased direction, but more
than twenty percent violates either stationarity or time consistency in a
future-biased direction.
Columns (2)–(4) explore whether noise from a trembling hand or the
presence of corner allocations can account for the limited overlap between
time consistency and stationarity. Column (2) relaxes the definition of
stationarity, time consistency and time invariance violations to allocations
differing by at least two vouchers to investigate the effects of a trembling
hand. Column (3) excludes all participants who selected two or more
identical corner allocations in which participants allocate all vouchers to
one of the two payment dates, since these reveal participants’ preferences
only weakly: their preferred allocations may violate time consistency,
stationarity, or time invariance, but this is not observed. As a final
robustness check, Column (4) assumes that choices involving two identical
corner allocations (i.e. all choices from which we cannot infer whether a
concept is violated) do in fact represent a violation.14 In this way, the results
represent an upper bound to the number of violations. These robustness
checks show qualitatively similar patterns as Column (1). We also rule out
the possibility that the low correlation between violations of time consis-
tency and stationarity is only driven by random noise (see A.1), or by
features of the experimental design (see A.2).
In sum, our experiment provides evidence that violations of time
consistency and stationarity often do not coincide. Violations of time
invariance correlate much better with violations of stationarity and time
consistency. To the extent that time consistency and stationarity do not
overlap, observed behavior may well be driven by other mechanisms than
hyperbolic discounting. We discussed earlier that in a context with limited
access to credit, discrepancies between stationarity and time consistency
may arise from changing background wealth. The remainder of this section
will test to what extent liquidity constraints can explain our results.
4.3. Behavioral mechanisms: liquidity constraints
Section 2 formulated the hypotheses that in a context with limited
access to credit, anticipated wealth changes result in violations of
stationarity but not time consistency, while unanticipated wealth
changes result in violations of time consistency but not stationarity.
To test these hypotheses, we analyze whether violations of stationarity
and time consistency emerge differently for participants with relatively
less access to informal credit (who either cannot raise NGN 20,000 at
all, or need to borrow from three or more persons to raise this amount)
Fig. 3. Comparing distribution of participants to distribution in Halevy (2015). S:
Stationarity (x x=1,1 1,2); TC: Time Consistency (x x=1,2 2,2); TI: Time Invariance
(x x=1,1 2,2). The percentages listed here from Halevy (2015) are based on Column 1
from Table II on page 345 of Halevy Y., Time consistency: stationarity and time
invariance, Econometrica 83 (1), 2015, 335–352.
13 The second correlation compares present-biased violations of stationarity to
violations of time invariance where participants become more patient. A participant
who allocates 6 vouchers to ‘in one month’ (and the remaining 4 to ‘tomorrow’) and 8
vouchers to ‘in 3 months’ (and the remaining 2 to ‘in 2 months’) violates stationarity in a
present-biased direction. If this person is time consistent (i.e. allocates 8 vouchers to the
later payment date in the second-round choice), she becomes more patient. Following a
similar line of reasoning, the correlation of present-biased violations of time consistency
and time invariance on the other hand compares present-biased violations of time
consistency to violations of time invariance where participants become less patient.
14 In both Columns (3) and (4), violations of stationarity, time consistency and time
invariance are defined in the same way as Column (1).
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and a relatively large reduction in wealth (measured as a wealth
reduction of more than 80 percent between the first and the second
round, i.e. the quarter with the largest relative reduction). We label
participants satisfying both criteria as more liquidity-constrained.
Fig. 4 compares their behavior (light-grey bar) with that of the
remainder of participants who are less liquidity-constrained (dark-grey
bars); that is, participants with either more access to informal credit, or
without a large reduction in wealth. The figure classifies participants
into four categories: those who violate neither stationarity nor time
consistency (Group 1), those who violate stationarity but not time
consistency (Group 2), those who violate time consistency but not
stationarity (Group 3), and those who violate both stationarity and time
consistency (Groups 4 and 5). Panels (a) and (b) focus on present-
biased and future-biased violations, respectively.
Hypothesis 1a states that anticipated decreases in wealth are associated
with future-biased violations of stationarity but not time consistency. This
correlation should be stronger for more liquidity-constrained participants,
who by definition experienced a relatively large loss but have less access to
informal credit to smooth consumption over time. The proportion of
participants in Group 2 in Fig. 4b is indeed larger for the more liquidity-
constrained compared to the less liquidity-constrained sample, although
the difference is not statistically significant.
To further delve into the differences between more and less liquidity-
constrained participants, Table 5 splits the sample of less constrained
participants (whose behavior is summarized in the dark-grey bars in Fig. 4)
into three groups: participants with more access to credit without a large
reduction in wealth in Column (1); participants with more access to credit
and with a large reduction in wealth in Column (2); and participants with
less access to credit but without large wealth reduction in Column (4).
Column (5) presents violation patterns for more liquidity-constrained
participants (represented by the light-grey bars in Fig. 4, with both less
access to credit and a large reduction in wealth ). Panel A only includes
violations in a present-biased direction and Panel B in a future-biased
direction. Columns (3), (6), (7) and (8) test whether differences between the
various subsamples are significant. As an additional test of H1a, Panel B of
Table 5 compares the proportion of participants who violate stationarity but
not time consistency in a future-biased direction between the four
subsamples and confirms that all differences are in the expected direction
but lack statistical significance.
Hypothesis 2a states that unanticipated decreases in background wealth
are associated with present-biased violations of time consistency, but not
stationarity. Consistent with this hypothesis, 47 percent of more liquidity-
constrained participants violate time consistency but not stationarity in a
present-biased direction (Fig. 4a), which is a significantly larger proportion
than the 18 percent in the less constrained sample. Panel A of Table 5
shows that this pattern is most pronounced for participants who have both
less access to credit and who have experienced a large loss, as differences
between participants with and without a large loss or between participants
with more and less access to credit are not significant (Columns (3), (7),
and (8)).15
Hypotheses 1b and 2b predict violation patterns for participants
whose background wealth increases. As a corollary, more liquidity-
Table 4
Distribution of violations of stationarity and time consistency.
Violation if allocation Excl. Counting 2
differs by more than participants identical corners
… vouchers: with ≥2 as a violation
>0 >1 identical corners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Counting violations in both PB and FB directions
No violations of S or TC 0.371 0.492 0.120 0.050
Violation of S, but not of TC 0.192 0.138 0.140 0.058
Violation of TC but not of S 0.196 0.258 0.270 0.113
Violations of both S and TC 0.242 0.113 0.470 0.779
Correlation violations S, TC 0.212 0.095 0.087 0.283
Correlation violations S, TI 0.541 0.424 0.423 0.493
Correlation violations TC, TI 0.548 0.621 0.584 0.627
Panel B. Counting only violations in a PB direction
No PB violations of S or TC 0.542 0.646 0.330 0.154
PB violation of S, but not of TC 0.142 0.058 0.170 0.075
PB violation of TC, but not of S 0.213 0.229 0.320 0.196
PB violations of both S and TC 0.104 0.067 0.180 0.575
Correlation PB violations S, TC 0.131 0.197 0.021 0.369
Correlation PB violations S, TI 0.517 0.371 0.261 0.518
Correlation PB violations TC, TI 0.738 0.730 0.864 0.689
Panel C. Counting only violations in a FB direction
No FB violations of S or TC 0.725 0.825 0.540 0.254
FB violation of S, but not of TC 0.154 0.100 0.220 0.171
FB violation of TC, but not of S 0.088 0.050 0.200 0.154
FB violations of both S and TC 0.033 0.025 0.040 0.421
Correlation FB violations S, TC 0.084 0.179 -0.120 0.332
Correlation FB violations S, TI 0.449 0.357 0.353 0.621
Correlation FB violations TC, TI 0.597 0.633 0.819 0.744
Number of observations 240 240 100 240
PB: Present-biased. FB: Future-biased. S: Stationarity. TI: Time invariance. TC: Time consistency. Time invariance cannot be classified as either present- or future-biased. The
correlation of PB violations of S and TI compares PB stationarity violations to time-invariance violations where participants become more patient, because when choices satisfy time
consistency but violate stationarity in a PB direction, choices will have become more patient. The correlation of PB violations of TC and TI on the other hand compares PB time-
consistency violations to time-invariance violations where participants become less patient, following a similar line of reasoning. For FB correlations, the patterns are exactly reversed:
the correlations between FB violations of S and TI use time-invariance violations where participants become less patient, while the correlations between FB violations of TC and TI use
time-invariance violations where participants become more patient.
15 As a robustness check, we also estimated a logit model for the relation between
liquidity constraints and violating only time consistency (but not stationarity) in a
present-biased direction, using various definitions of ‘large’ reductions in wealth. Our
main findings are insensitive to the percentage at which a reduction in wealth is defined
as ‘large’ (within reasonable bounds), and to controlling for potential confounds of the
relation between liquidity constraints and choice reversals (see Online Appendix Table
B4). Thus, the finding that violations of time consistency but not stationarity are more
common among more liquidity-constrained participants is robust to varying thresholds
in the definition of a ‘large’ loss.
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constrained participants should display these violation patterns less
often than the less constrained sample. Hypothesis 1b states that
anticipated increases in wealth are associated with present-biased
violations of stationarity, but not time consistency. Hence, in Fig. 4a
more liquidity-constrained participants should be classified into Group
2 less often compared to less liquidity-constrained participants.
Indeed, 15 percent of less constrained participants violate stationarity
but not time consistency in a present-biased direction, while this is the
case for only 7 percent of more constrained participants. This
difference is driven by the subsample with more access to credit, as
shown in Panel A of Table 5. Present-biased violations of stationarity
but not time consistency are especially prevalent among participants
with more access to credit and without a large loss, i.e. the least
constrained subsample.16
Hypothesis 2b states that unanticipated increases in wealth are
associated with future-biased violations of time consistency, but not
stationarity. This implies that in Fig. 4b, more constrained participants
should fall less often into Group 3 than other participants. The
proportion violating time consistency but not stationarity in a future-
biased direction is small among both samples, and is indeed the lowest
among more liquidity-constrained participants. Although this differ-
ence is not statistically significant, Panel B of Table 5 shows that among
participants with less access to credit, those with a large loss are
significantly less likely to fall into Group 3 when focusing on violations
in a future-biased direction (p < 0.10).17
In sum, these findings suggest that the observed non-overlapping
violations of time consistency and stationarity are not purely random.
Violations of either time consistency or stationarity are correlated with
wealth changes and access to informal credit, consistent with theore-
tical predictions. Thus, by measuring either stationarity or time
consistency, one may well measure the extent to which a participant
is liquidity-constrained, instead of measuring whether he or she is a
hyperbolic discounter.
5. Conclusion
Hyperbolic discounting is one potential reason for low savings,
limiting consumption smoothing among low-income households. Most
evidence of hyperbolic discounting is inferred from (cross-sectional)
static choice experiments in which participants choose whether to
receive a sooner-smaller or later-larger payment, with payment dates in
either the near future or in a more distant future. Such experiments
elicit violations of stationarity. Alternatively, one can elicit violations
of time consistency by means of a longitudinal design in which
participants choose at different points in time whether to receive a
sooner-smaller versus later-larger payment, keeping the payment dates
fixed. Both choice reversals may however also be driven by violations of
time invariance, meaning that participants express different prefer-
ences regarding near-future payment dates depending on when they
make their decisions. Hyperbolic discounting can be inferred from
stationarity or time consistency violations only when intertemporal
choice is time-invariant.
A field experiment in rural Nigeria analyzed to what extent
violations of stationarity and time consistency result from violations
of time invariance, and whether these violations are related to liquidity
constraints. Using convex time budgets, we asked participants during a
first round to allocate a future gift between ‘tomorrow’ and ‘one month
from now’, as well as between ‘two months from now’ and ‘three
months from now’; and during a second round two months later, we
asked the same participants to allocate their gift between ‘tomorrow’
and ‘in one month from now’, referring to the same calendar dates as in
the second choice. A participant with different allocations in the first
and the second choice violates stationarity; different allocations in the
Fig. 4. Violation patterns for more versus less liquidity constrained participants.
Significance levels for comparisons of more versus less constrained participants are
estimated from a regression of falling into Group X on participant type, with standard
errors clustered at the household level. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. (a) Present-
biased violations, (b) Future-biased violations.
16 Online Appendix Table B3 presents the results for people who experienced a large
increase in net wealth instead of a large loss. Large gains are associated with significantly
different violation patterns only among individuals with less access to credit, suggesting
that again the interaction of credit access and changes in wealth influences decisions. For
(footnote continued)
individuals with less access to credit, those with large gains are more likely to satisfy both
time consistency and stationarity, and less likely to violate time consistency but not
stationarity in a present-biased direction. Gains improve their ability to smooth
consumption over time, reducing the need to violate time consistency in a present-
biased direction. Further, conditional on having less access to credit, individuals with
large gains are less likely to violate stationarity, but not time consistency, in a future-
biased direction. This is consistent with the theory that these individuals anticipate a less
binding liquidity constraint in the distant future than those without large gains.
17 Online Appendix Table B5 investigates heterogeneity in violation patterns by
participants’ main source of income. The table compares farming and non-farming
participants. We find no heterogeneity in present-biased violation patterns. By contrast,
in terms of future-biased violations, a large reduction in wealth is associated with a
higher probability of violating especially stationarity among farming participants, and a
lower probability of time consistency violations among non-farmers. We however note
that for most of our participants, household income depends heavily on the agricultural
season, even when the participant himself or herself does not report farming as main
source of income.
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second and the third choice imply a violation of time consistency; and a
difference between the first and the third choice is a violation of time
invariance.
We find that 43.4 percent of participants violate time consistency
and a similar 43.8 percent violates stationarity. However, 62 percent of
these participants do not violate both stationarity and time consistency;
and among those who do violate both, choice reversals often move in
opposite directions, frequently violating time consistency in a present-
biased direction while violating stationarity in a future-biased direc-
tion. Only 10.4 percent of participants violate both stationarity and
time consistency in a present-biased direction, which is potentially
explained by hyperbolic discounting. Other participants’ choice rever-
sals coincide with violations of time invariance, making hyperbolic
discounting a less likely explanation. These findings are both qualita-
tively and quantitatively similar to results from a laboratory experi-
ment with undergraduate students at the University of British
Colombia in Vancouver (Halevy, 2015).
Our results indicate that especially individuals who are relatively
more liquidity constrained (i.e. those with greater reductions in wealth
and less access to credit) are more likely to violate time consistency but
not stationarity in a present-biased direction, and that they are more
likely to violate stationarity but not time consistency in a future-biased
direction. These findings are in line with our theoretical predictions for
participants facing unanticipated and anticipated liquidity constraints,
respectively.18 We conclude that liquidity constraints can drive a wedge
between stationarity and time consistency. When disposable income
fluctuates over time and individuals lack sound financial instruments to
smooth consumption, one cannot infer hyperbolic discounting from
observing either a stationarity or a time consistency violation alone.
Hence, experiments that aim to measure hyperbolic discounting cannot
rely on measuring either time consistency or stationarity, unless they
can rule out violations of time invariance.
The literature highlights two potential explanations for violations of
time invariance in the presence of liquidity constraints. First, the poor
are generally exposed to large uninsured risks, resulting in frequent
expenditure shocks and volatile incomes (Dercon, 2002). Those with
less access to credit are unable to absorb unanticipated shocks to their
financial situation, and cannot fully smooth consumption in the
presence of anticipated changes either. Hence, both anticipated and
unanticipated changes in one's background wealth can shift the
marginal rate of substitution (Dean and Sautmann, 2016; Epper,
2016). This, in turn, results in violations of time invariance.
Second, recent theories on the psychology of poverty suggest that
scarcity can reduce decision-making quality by making households
focus on the present (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). A financial shock
creating scarcity may hence temporarily increase present bias, amplify-
ing violations of time invariance. In low-income settings, the overlap
between violations of time consistency and stationarity may therefore
not be as strong as it is in a context with less volatile incomes and
expenditures, especially for the most liquidity-constrained households.
Thus, our findings are not necessarily contradictory of hyperbolic
discounting and present bias; however, the role of such preferences
in decision-making may become less dominant as households start
facing more binding liquidity constraints. More research is needed to
test these two explanations for violations of time invariance.
Our findings have important implications for the design of financial
tools, such as commitment savings devices. Choice reversals in one-
time experiments have often led to the conclusion that time-incon-
sistent behavior is driven by hyperbolic discounting and present bias.
Commitment devices help individuals who are aware of this bias to
commit to their earlier plans (Ashraf et al., 2006; Bryan et al., 2010;
Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). An important question, however, is how
‘hard’ commitments should be for a savings device to generate the
highest value; when individuals cannot tailor their savings plans to
fluctuations in their financial means, or when they cannot withdraw
their savings in times of financial pressure, they have less flexibility to
smooth consumption in the presence of changing circumstances. In
theory, sophisticated hyperbolic discounters will hence trade off their
desired level of commitment with their perceived need for flexibility.
Based on our findings, we conjecture that flexibility becomes
relatively more important when individuals have limited access to
credit and insurance, especially when incomes or expenditures are
highly volatile. For such individuals, the hard constraints imposed by
commitment savings devices may be too strong. In support of these
theoretical conjectures, recent empirical work finds greater impacts of
soft commitment savings devices with flexible rules compared to
Table 5
Distribution of violations of stationarity and time consistency.
More access to credit Less access to credit More vs Less access
No large Large
No large Large Diff. No large Large Diff. loss loss
loss loss (2)-(1) loss loss (5)-(4) (4)-(1) (5)-(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Counting only violations in a present-biased direction
No PB violations of either S or TC 0.500 0.600 0.100 0.608 0.400 −0.208† 0.108 −0.200
PB Violation of S, but not of TC (cf. H1b) 0.211 0.033 −0.177** 0.137 0.067 −0.071 −0.073 0.033
PB Violation of TC, but not of S (cf. H2a) 0.171 0.300 0.129 0.137 0.467 0.329** −0.034 0.167
PB Violations of both S and TC 0.118 0.067 −0.051 0.118 0.067 −0.051 −0.000 0.000
Panel B. Counting only violations in a future-biased direction
No FB violations of either S or TC 0.763 0.733 −0.030 0.686 0.733 0.047 −0.077 0.000
FB Violation of S, but not of TC (cf. H1a) 0.132 0.200 0.068 0.137 0.233 0.096 0.006 0.033
FB Violation of TC, but not of S (cf. H2b) 0.079 0.033 −0.046 0.127 0.033 −0.094† 0.049 0.000
FB Violations of both S and TC 0.026 0.033 0.007 0.049 0.000 −0.049* 0.023 −0.033
Number of observations 76 30 102 30
S: Stationarity. TI: Time invariance. TC: Time consistency. An individual is classified as having less access to credit if they cannot borrow 20,000 NGN in case of an emergency, or needs
to borrow from three or more different people to raise this amount; and as having a large loss when wealth reduces by more than 80 percent between the first and the second round (the
quarter with the largest relative reduction). Significance levels are based on a t-test for β = 0, where β is the difference across choice types in vouchers allocated to the later payment
date, estimated with standard errors clustered at the household level.
† p < 0.10.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
18 As such, our results provide a potential explanation for future-biased violations of
stationarity, which are a commonly observed puzzle in choice experiments.
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impacts of more binding alternatives (Dupas and Robinson, 2013;
Karlan and Linden, 2016). More research is needed to understand
which types of commitment technologies are most effective under
varying circumstances in generating demand, stimulating usage, and
reaching intended goals. Nonetheless, it is crucial that such commit-
ment devices - although context-dependent - help the poor achieve
their savings and investment goals without compromising their ability
to also smooth consumption.
Appendix A. Alternative explanations for time invariance violations
Section 4.3 attributes the wedge between violations of time consistency and stationarity to liquidity constraints. This appendix analyzes the
potential role of random noise in decision-making and experimental factors.
A.1. Behavioral mechanisms II: random noise in decision-making
The remarkable similarity of our findings with those of Halevy (2015), despite stark differences in the experimental designs, raises the question
whether the observed patterns result from random noise in decision-making. A trembling hand results in violations of time invariance and can
hence potentially express itself in similar ways in different experiments.
To analyze whether random noise can generate choice patterns comparable to those in our experiment, we simulate choices under the
assumption that participants violate time invariance only because of random noise, not because of changes in background wealth. To that end, we
first estimate a random utility model using maximum likelihood.19 Estimated parameters include discount factors δ and β, a CRRA parameter ρ and
the level of noise μ. Using these estimates, we then simulate participants’ allocations, abstracting from changes in background wealth, so that only
random noise can explain why a participant violates time invariance (and hence violates either time consistency or stationarity).
Formally, if s ∈ {1, 2} indicates the decision round, σ ∈ {1, 2} the payment round, and v ∈ {100, 120, 150, 200}S the value of vouchers allocated
to the sooner payment date, let the intertemporal utility from allocating x vouchers to the later payment date beU x v( ; )s σ S, , which is defined in Eqs.
(1)–(3). We assume that background wealth at both the sooner and the later payment date is zero in each of the three equations. The probability
that a participant allocates x vouchers to the later payment date can be written as the ratio of utility from this allocation to the utility summed over
all ten possible allocations, so that choices with higher utility have a higher probability of being selected:
P x x v
U x v
U z v
( = ; ) =
( ; )
∑ ( ; )
s σ S
s σ S μ










where μ > 0 is a parameter specifying the degree of noise (if μ is infinitesimal, then there is no noise, and as μ is going to infinity, decision-making
becomes an entirely random process). If background wealth is constant in Eqs. (1)–(3) (Section 2), the optimization problem is equivalent for first-
and second-round allocations regarding near-future payment dates, x1,1 and x2,2. Thus, these allocations would be the same in the absence of
random noise, and simulated choices can violate time invariance only due to noise.
Following Harrison et al. (2013), we estimate the model using maximum likelihood.20 We assume that instantaneous utility is of the CRRA type,
u c c ρ( ) = /(1 − )ρ1− , where ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and consumption c is equal to c v x= (10 − )S S on the sooner payment date and
c x= 200L on the later payment date. The estimated (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting parameter β, the noise parameter μ, and the risk aversion
parameter ρ, together with a participant's voucher value vS, the decision round s, and the round in which payments occur σ, yield estimates of the
cumulative probability that a participant allocates xs σ, vouchers to the later payment date:







These cumulative distribution functions are in turn used to simulate the allocation every participant chooses in each of the three choices, which
allows us to calculate correlations between violations of stationarity, time consistency, and time invariance.21
Appendix Table A1 compares our experimental findings in Column (1) with simulated outcomes in Column (2)-(9). Due to the large number of
corner allocations, utility is estimated to be convex, ρ < 0. Since this assumption is disputable, Columns (2)-(5) present simulation results imposing
linear utility (ρ = 0), while utility is convex in Columns (6)-(9). Columns (2)-(3) and (6)-(7) impose exponential discounting, β = 1, so that
violations of stationarity and time consistency are driven solely by noise. Columns (4)-(5) and (8)-(9) assume quasi-hyperbolic discounting, β < 1.
As a result, time invariance violations are still due to noise, while violations of stationarity and time consistency may also arise from a present bias.
We present simulated outcomes assuming two different levels of noise, μ, which are estimated using maximum likelihood with linear and CRRA
utility respectively.
19 Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) note that when using this method, the estimated choice probabilities will not satisfy monotonicity with respect to preference parameters. They
show that this problem is of economic relevance especially when estimating risk aversion parameters; when estimating discount rates, this problem occurs only with substantial delays
between the sooner and the later payment dates (e.g. two years), well beyond the delays observed in experiments that are comparable to ours.
20 Doing so, we build on STATA routines carefully explained in Harrison (2008). This estimation procedure has the ability to properly analyze corner allocations as well. This is
particularly important in our data set, since many participants do not choose an interior allocation, but allocate all vouchers to one of the payment dates. Such corner allocations
represent censored decisions, which potentially biases estimates in linear regressions. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) propose using Tobit regressions to estimate the model, but the
Tobit model makes a number of theoretical assumptions that are inconsistent with the set-up of convex time budget tasks (Harrison et al., 2013).
21 The routine follows a procedure described in Meier and Sprenger (2015). First, every participant-choice observation is assigned a random number zihsσ from a uniform distribution
U ∼ [0, 1]. Second, the random number is compared with the cumulative probabilities. If the random number satisfies CDF a V sσ z CDF a V sσ(( − 1); , ) ≤ < ( ; , )ih ihsσ ih , with
CDF V sσ( − 1; , ) = 0ih for a decision moment s, payment dates σ and voucher value V, then the simulated number of vouchers allocated to the later payment date is X a∼ =ihsσ .
Third, the routine calculates a number of summary statistics: the percentage of participants for whom we observe violations of time invariance, of time consistency, and of stationarity;
the direction of these violations; and the correlation between these different violations. This routine is repeated 999 times for each observation to derive 95% confidence intervals for
each statistic and p-values for the realized statistics in the experiment.
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The bottom section shows the correlation between violations of stationarity and time consistency. The actual correlation is 0.21 in Column (1).
This correlation is fairly high compared to the different simulated correlations in Columns (2)–(9), although it does not always fall outside the
simulated confidence intervals. The last row highlights the fact that overlapping violations of stationarity and time consistency often occur in a
future-biased or opposing direction, as the actual correlation is significantly lower than the simulated correlations when zooming in on present-
biased violations. Thus, given the modeled noise structure, random noise alone cannot account for the low correlation between (present-biased)
violations of stationarity and time consistency.
A.2. Behavioral mechanisms III: experimental factors
Finally, we discuss whether key features of the experimental design may have caused discrepancies between violations of stationarity and time
consistency. A first potential limitation is that intertemporal allocations are elicited using convex time budgets, which have been questioned to yield
valid choice patterns (Chakraborty et al., 2015). Our design does not include multiple price lists and does not vary experimental wealth or the delay
between the sooner and the later payment date, so that we cannot test the weak axiom of revealed preferences, or test for wealth and impatience
monotonicity, robustness checks proposed by Chakraborty et al. Nevertheless, we showed in Section 3.3 that only few participants violate demand
monotonicity, suggesting they have understood the convex time budget task. Further, convex time budgets have been shown to have equal or better
predictive validity compared to double multiple price lists (Andreoni et al., 2015), supporting the validity of our method to elicit violations of time
consistency and stationarity.
A second factor potentially biasing time preference experiments is a lack of trust in the experimenters among participants (Thaler, 1981; Chabris
et al., 2008; Sprenger, 2015). Participants who do not trust experimenters to return with their money on future dates will make different decisions
for allocations where ‘today’ is one of the payment dates than for allocations with only future payment dates, regardless from whether this person is
a hyperbolic discounter. To avoid this we only included payment dates in the future, so that the soonest payment date is no longer immediate.
Several recent studies adopt this approach and fail to reject stationarity at the aggregate level, suggesting that this indeed does eliminate changes in
trust as a potential confound (e.g. Sprenger, 2015; Giné et al., 2016; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). Further indications that limited levels of trust
have not influenced participants’ allocations follow from the observation that even when there is no return on waiting (i.e. sooner vouchers are
worth 200 NGN so that they do not ‘lose’ any money by allocating vouchers to the sooner date) participants allocate some vouchers to the later date
in the first-round choice regarding near-future payment dates, as shown in Fig. 2. Participants thus appear to have trusted the experimenter to hold
on to their money, suggesting that discrepancies between stationarity and time consistency violations are not driven by a lack of trust.
Decision fatigue or limited attention spans offer a third potential reason for the lack of overlap between violations of stationarity and time
consistency in our experiment. In the second round, participants only had to allocate their vouchers once, while they were presented with eight
different choices in the first round. As a result, participants may have paid more attention to their choice in the second round than they did in their
first-round choices. Hoddinott et al. (2016) find that when participants become fatigued, they behave more impatiently. Thus, if fatigue were a
problem in our sample, we would expect participants to choose less patient allocations in their last decisions in the first round. However, the last
first-round choices were near-future allocations. As shown in Fig. 2, participants actually do not behave more impatiently in these choices compared
to their first set of choices, which concerned the distant-future payment dates. Fatigue does not explain why time consistency and stationarity do not
overlap.
A fourth possible confound is that participants were interviewed about their cash inflows and outflows on a weekly basis as part of a larger
project, potentially increasing awareness of a present bias among hyperbolic discounters. In other words, hyperbolic discounting may have
Table A1
Outcomes realized in the experiment and in Monte Carlo simulations.
Linear utility (ρ = 0) CRRA utility (ρ ≠ 0)
Discounting Exponential Hyperbolic Exponential Hyperbolic
ρ = 0, ρ = 0, ρ = − 0.77, ρ = − 0.71,
β = 1 β = 0.82 β = 1 β = 0.72
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
μ Actual 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.09 0.24
Proportion violating time consistency
Violation: x x≠1,2 2,2 0.44 0.84 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.26 0.73 0.31 0.77
Present-biased: x x>1,2 2,2 0.32 0.42 0.45 0.57 0.52 0.13 0.36 0.18 0.47
Proportion violating stationarity
Violation: x x≠1,2 1,1 0.43 0.84 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.26 0.73 0.30 0.77
Present-biased: x x>1,2 1,1 0.25 0.42 0.45 0.57 0.52 0.13 0.36 0.18 0.48
Proportion violating time invariance
Violation: x x≠1,1 2,2 0.58 0.84 0.90 0.81 0.89 0.26 0.72 0.27 0.72
Less patient: x x>1,1 2,2 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.13 0.36 0.13 0.36
Correlations between violations of stationarity and time consistency
Violation 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.37 0.16 0.42 0.20
Present-biased 0.13 0.44 0.37 0.49 0.39 0.86 0.57 0.88 0.62
Symbol ρ is the CRRA coefficient, β a present bias by which instantaneous utility for future payments is discounted, and μ indicates the degree of noise. Parameters estimated by means
of maximum likelihood are marked .̂ . Columns (2)–(5) assume linear utility (ρ = 0), while Columns (6)–(9) use the estimated risk aversion parameter (ρ ). Columns (2)–(3) and (6)–(7)
assume exponential discounting (β = 1), while Columns (4)–(5) and (8)–(9) use the estimated present bias parameter (β ). All models are estimated for two levels of noise: the estimated
noise level assuming linear utility (μ = 0.09) and the estimated noise level assuming CRRA (μ = 0.24). When linear utility is assumed (Columns (2)–(5)), the estimated degree of noise is
0.09, so there is a hat in Column (2) and (4). There are no hats in Columns (3) and (5), because there the assumed degree of noise is the degree that is estimated when assuming CRRA
utility. Similarly, when CRRA utility is assumed in Columns (6)–(9), the estimated degree of noise is 0.24. As a result, there are hats in Columns (7) and (9), but not in Columns (6) and
(8) which assume the degree of noise based on the estimation assuming linear utility.
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presented itself in a more sophisticated way during the second round than during the first round, affecting second-round choices, x2,2. To test
whether frequent interviewing affected the level of participants’ financial sophistication, the project randomly selected a number of control
households to be interviewed only at baseline and during an endline survey one year later. Self-reported financial planning improved from baseline
to midline among all respondents, also those in the control group, and we do not observe stronger improvements in financial planning for
participants interviewed on a weekly basis (see Online Appendix Table B6). It is hence unlikely that frequent interviewing explains the discrepancy
between violations of stationarity and time consistency.
A fifth factor potentially weakening the correlation between stationarity and time consistency is the elicitation method of the second-round
choice. In the second round of the experiment, participants are shown their first-round allocation for the distant future and asked whether they
would like to revise this choice. This procedure, adopted from Giné et al. (2016), could potentially increase the probability of observing time-
consistent choices that nevertheless violate stationarity and time invariance. However, comparing our results to Halevy (2015) (who did not present
the second round as a revision and did not show participants their first-round allocations during the second round), we observe a similar proportion
of participants who satisfy time consistency but violate stationarity and time invariance. We hence conjecture that presenting the second-round
choice as a revision does not confound our results.
Finally, the limited presence of formal financial institutions in the region where our research was conducted may also have influenced our
findings. Most participants in our experiment do not have access to formal financial instruments to save or borrow against future payments at a
fixed, salient interest rate. Therefore, participants cannot engage in financial arbitrage using their experimental payments. Hence we do not need to
censor the marginal rate of substitution elicited from participants’ choices by the market interest rate (Cubitt and Read, 2007, Chabris et al., 2008;
Andersen et al., 2014).
In sum, limited trust in the experimenters, decision-making fatigue, improved financial awareness due to high-frequency data collection among
a subsample of participants, presenting the second-round choice as a revision, and arbitrage do not seem to drive our results. We conclude that
violations of stationarity and time consistency often do not overlap, and this can be explained partly by changes in participants’ financial situation.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.12.011.
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